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AFFATUS: NATURAL SCIENCE AS MORAL THEOLOGY 
(Part one) 
Ramon Llulls proposal that speech constitutes a sixth sense called 
affatus is, arguably, the most unusual doctrine from his entire extraor-
dinary career. Almost every modern scholar of his work has speculated 
about its origins or purpose. This interest has increased lately thanks to 
thc publication of critical cditions of the Catalan and Latin texts of Llull's 
monographic treatise on affatus} In addition, modern trends of linguistic 
and literary theory —from generative grammar to semiotics to deconstruc-
tion— have also encouraged further study of affatus.2 Recent interpreta-
tions of Llull's proposal have ranged from Jordi Llovet's analysis of its 
"nostalgia for the letter of desire" to Joan Tusquet's critiquc of its "se-
miotic apologetic".'1 Despite this diversity of perspective, most studies of 
LkuTs doctrine have sought to identifv a precise "source" for his proposal, 
either in a single linguistic precedent for thc term affatus itself or in a 
single philosophical precedent for the classification of speech as a sixth 
1 Catalan Lo sise semj, ed. Joscp Perarnau i Espelt, "Lo sise seny, lo qual apeHam 
affatut, de Hamon Llull. Edicio i estudi". ATCA 2 (1983) : 23 -121 ; text eited as SS by 
line, introduetion cited as "Lo sisd seny" oy page. Latin Liber de affatu, ed. Armand Lli-
nnres and Alexandre Jean Gondras, "Affatus", Archives d'Histnire Doctrinate et Litterairc 
du Moyen Ane 51 (1984) : 269-97; cited as LA by page. Interested readcrs should consult 
these editors' introductions for full rcviews of the history of older scholarship on affatus; 
this article will cite only those carlier studies that bear directly on questions discusscd 
below. 
• Sebastian Trias Mcrcanfs El pensamiento y la palabra (Aspectos ohidados de la filo-
aofto dc R. Llult) (Pahna de Mallorca: Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Picdad de Balearcs, 
1972) rcmains thc best enmprehensive account of LhuTs linguistic ideas apart from affatus. 
* Jordi Llovet, "Ramon Llull: nostalgia de la lletra", in Jordi Llovet, Xavier Rubert de 
Ventos, and Eugenio Trias. De 1'amor, cl dcsin i attrcs passions (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 
1980) 89-151 (esp. 139-42). Joan Tusrmets i Terrats. "El lenguajc como argnmento, en 
la apologetica dc Ramon Llull", E L 28 (1988) : 169-210. 
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sense. Neither approach has proven completely successful, and it is easy 
to accept Josep Perarnau's conclusion that Llull's proposal is simply not 
"homologablc" with common Scholastic linguistic or psvchological doctri-
ncs. 4 Such a judgement does not, howevcr, nican that LluITs proposal is 
incomprehensible as a contribution to late-thirteenth century philosophv 
or theology. This study proposes to rcnder affatus comprchensible by 
broadening our perspeetive of inquiry to include medieval Christian moral 
thcology regarding speech. It attempts to show how affatus results from 
Llull's effort to refonn linguistic or psvchological doctrines regarding 
speech by elucidating their implications for ethical conduct. 
That is, Ramon Llull creates affatus by moralizing Scholastic scien-
tific accounts of speech. To arguc that a mcdieval writer finds spiritual 
lessons in natural phenomena is scarcely a novcl insight. Wc acknowledge 
the pervasive role of moralization in medieval culture whenever we speak 
of the "symbolist mentalitv" or "ethical poctic" of thc Christian Middlc 
Ages.r> The practice of applying tropologia or moralizatio to the liber na-
turae stretches in a virtually unbroken tradition from the Phijsiologus of 
Late Antiquity to the Tractatus moralis de oculo of Pierre de Limoges in 
Llull's own day." The mendicant preachers' use of the moral interpreta-
tion of natural exempla in popular preaching assured its pervasive con-
tribution to the development of vernacular literature. 7 In a superb article 
' "Lo sisi seny" 51 . Reviewing Pernmau's wnrk and other recent schnlarsliip nn itffatus. 
Anthnny Bnnner observes that nn adequntc undcrstnnding nf afjtitus still rcquircs fuxther 
investigation of at least three questinns: its place in semiotics, its possiblc Stoic origin, nnd 
its place within Lullian epistemology; see £ L 25 (1981-83) : 280-1 . 
5 Marie-Dominiquc Chenu, "La mentalite symbolique", Let Theologie au douzieme Mcle 
(Paris: J . Vrin, 1957) 159-90. Judson Boycc Allen. The Ethical Poetic of the Later Sliddlc 
Ages: A Decurum of Couvenient Distinction (Toronto: University of Toronto Prcss, 1982). 
* Physiologus, tr. Michael J . Curley (Austin: Univcrsity of Texas Press, 1979). On Latc 
Antique theories of spiritual interpretation, sec Jamcs A. Coulter. Tlie Literary Siicrocosm: 
Theories of Interpretation of the Latcr Neo)tlatonists (Lelden: E. J. Brill, 1976), Jran Pcpin, 
"L'absurdite, signe de l'allegorie", Studia Patristicd 1 (1957>: 395-413 . and Craziann Hi-
panti, "II problema della comprensione neH'enneneutica agustiniana", Aeciir des Etudes 
Aimustiniennes 20 (1974) : 88-99. 
On Pierre and his work. see Nicnle Bericm, "I.n prcdication nu beguinnge dc Paris 
pendant 1'ann^e liturgique 1272-1273" , Recherches aunstiniennes 13 (1978) : 105-229 (esp. 
107-16). On the evolutinn of tropological exegesis in thc pcriod, scc Cillian R. Evnns. Thc 
LdnRuage and Logic of thc Bihle: The Earlier Sfiddle Anes (Cnmbridge: Cnmbridge Univcr-
sity Press, 1984) and Tlte Lannuaiic and Logic o/ the Bihle: The Road to Rcformation 
(Cambridgc: Cambridgc University Press, 1985), :is wcll :is tlic S I . I I K I . I K ! works ol Ilcnri 
de Lubac, Exdgese medievale: les qutttre sens dc Vccriture, 4 vnls. (Aubicr: Mnntaignc, 
1959-64) and Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bihle in the Sliddle Aues, 2nd cd. (Oxford: 
B. Blackwell, 1952) . 
7 The superlative definitinn nf this practice is thc late Profcssor AIlen's summarv in 
Thc Friar as Critic: Literary Attitudes in the Later Stiddle Ages (Xnslivillr: Vandcibilt 
Univcrsity Press, 1971) 97-8. On the stylc nnd mcthods of vernnculnr |>opiilnr preacbing 
sre thc cxhaustivc study of Michcl Zink, Ltt vrcdication en langue romane avant 1300 
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rccently published in this journal, Ll. Cabre, M. Ortin, and J . Pujol have 
demonstrated very clearly and carefully how the exempla of the Arbre 
exemplifical exhaustively develop moral lessons from the mass of scien-
tific and philosophical data collected in the first fourteen trees of LlulFs 
Arbre de cienciafi Cabre, Ortin, and Pujol develop their analysis from 
R. D. F. Pring-Mill's seminal suggestions regarding Llull's methods of 
"transmuting" scientific into literary texts through analogical argument." 
The three authors note that LlulTs analogies invariably tend to move from 
presentation of literal exemplary material to exposition of its tropological 
sense, achieving ultimately a fusion of scientific data and moral lesson. 1" 
This moralization shows how a creature achieves its prima intentio, as 
Llull calls it, of knowing, Ioving, and honoring the Creator. As a practical 
strategy of mission and reform, Llull's exercise of moralization develops 
the "evangelical allegory" and "philosophical anagogy" that Vicente Ser-
vera perspicuously identifies as a basic feature in all his proposals for 
conversion of thc infidel and renovation of Christian society. 1 1 Llull himself 
declares that he discovers affatus bv following the method of his own 
Art. 1 2 
Hence, it should not surprise us that, even though various parallels 
for affatus appear among Scholastic authorities, Llull's proposal of speech 
as a sixth sense ultimately results from his effort to correct and rectify 
their doctrines. Likewise, it should hardly surprise us to find that, even 
though Llull appears to introduce his proposal of affatus suddenly in 
1294, the process of moral interpretation that produced this new doctrine 
was alrcady under way in his earliest works, as Joan Tusquets has lately 
indicated. 1 8 Careful attention to Llull's accounts of language from both 
(Paris: H. Champion, 1976) . On the Catalan tradition, see Vincent Almazan, "L'Exemplum 
chez Vincent Ferrier", Romanischc Forschungen 79 (1967) : 288-332. 
' "'Coneixer e haver moralitats bones'. L'us de la literatura en YArbre exemplifical de 
Ramon Llull", EL 28 (1988) : 139-67. 
0 "Els recontaments de YArbre exemptifical de Ramon LIull: la transmutacio dc la cien-
cia cn literatura". Acles del Tercer CoHoqui Internacional de Llengua i Literatura Catd-
lanes (Oxford: Dolphin, 1976) 311-23 . 
1 0 "'Coneixer e haver moralitats bones'" 155, 145. 
" "Utopie et histoire: Les postulats th£oriques de la praxis missionnaire", Haymond 
Lulle et le Pays d'Oc, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 2 2 (Toulouse: Privat, 1987) 191-229. 
u LA 2 8 0 ; cf. SS 28-9. Perarnau identifies this mancra as the systcm of Absolute and 
Rrlativc Principles. as expounded in the Ars inventiva, and the doctrine of innate corre-
latives, as presented in the Taula general ("Lo sise' seny" 621. Not all of Llull's arguments, 
however, rely on thc Principles or correlatives. Others employ obviously analogical de-
monstrations that also appear in the Taula general, as Perarnau notes ("Lo sisc seny" 
77, 79 ) . 
"Lenguaje eomo argumento" 176. This development is no more unusual than thc 
process through which Llull evidently "discovered" the figures of his Art, in the manner 
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before and after 1294 allows us to appreciate how he develops his thcory 
of affatus by elucidating the moral issues pertinent to Scholastic philo-
sophical and scientific doctrinc concerning spcech. In order to shovv how 
he does this, the two parts of this article will review in delail the natural 
science and moral theology that affatus coinprehcnds. Part One describcs 
the role in Llull's new doctrine of commonplacc physiological and psy-
chological doctrines regarding the organs of speech, formation of concepts 
in the mind, or operation of the internal senses, and definitions of the 
"mental language" of the soul. Part Two dcscribcs thc role of traditional 
views from moral theology and spiritual instruction regarding the subor-
dination of bodv to soul and the fulfillment of love for God and neighbor. 
Part One: Affatus as Natural Science 
Llulls proposal of speech as a sixth sense implicates a very wide 
range of commonplace medieval physiological and psychological lore con-
cerning thc nature and functions of language. Our knowledge of Llull's 
medical learning has improved tremendously thanks to the recent resear-
ches of Pereira, Rodriguez Tejerina, and others. 1 4 A full account of thc 
development of his psychological theories remains to be written, how-
ever.1-"' For the purposes of understanding affatus, it is most important to 
rccognize how it incorporates phvsiological and psvehological lore con-
ccrning three broad subjects: the first is the classification of the cognitivc 
faculties; the second is the operation of these faculties; the third is thc 
function of cognition in general as "mental discourse". 
Ctassification of affatus among the scnses 
The easiest way to begin understanding affattis is to considcr it sim-
ply as a reclassification of the sensitive and cognitive powers commonlv 
attributed to both humans and animals by most ancient and medieval 
suggested by Dominique Urvoy, "Sur les origines des figures de l'"Art>i lullien", Raumond 
Lulle et le Pays d'Oc, Cahiers de Fanjeaux 22 (Toulousc: Privat, 1987) 249-59 (csp. 256 ' . 
" Michela Pcreira, "Le operc medichc di Lullo in rapporto con la sua filosofia natnralc 
e con la medicina del xiii secolo", EL 23 (1979) : 5-35. Jose Maria Rodrigurz Tejcrina, 
"El pensamicnto medico de Ramon Llull en la epoca dc Miramar", EL 22 (1978) : 71-6. 
1 5 For an initial oricntation, see Celestino Aos Braco, "La imaginacion en el sistcma dc 
Ramon Llull", EL 23 (1979) : 155-83. Still useful is the review of Lullian psychology by 
Bishop Joan Maura of Girona: "Psicologia luliana. El entcndimiento agcnte y el cntendi-
miento posible", Revista Luliatui 4 .37-38 (Oct.-Nov 1904) : 129-38 and 4.39-40 (Dec 1904-
Jan 1905) : 161-71; "Psicologia luliana. Verbo mental", ibid. 5 .43-46 (Apr-Jul 1905) : 
225-37; "Psicologia luliana. EI verbo scnsible y el sextn sentido", ibid. 5 .47-48 (Aug-Scpt 
1905) : 1-8; 5 .49 (Oct. 1905) : 33-7; and 5.50-51 (Nov-Dec 1905) : 49-77. 
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authorities. Llull's reorganization of these povvers is not merely arbitrary, 
but involves, as will become clear, the redistribution of their functions in 
order to maximize their ability to achieve his preferred moral objectives. 
From the beginning of his career Llull expounds a model of hu-
man nature that distinguishes five separate, cumulative levels of human 
powers or souls: vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, intellective, and moti-
ve. 1 " Most of these divisions ultimately remit to Aristotle. 1 7 However, 
they recall more immcdiately Avicenna's basic levels of vegetative, sensi-
tive, and intellectual souIs.1 M They also follow the tradition of internal 
senses based on Augustine's tripartite scheme of sensual, spiritual, and 
intellectual vision.11' The functions that Augustine describes for spiritual 
vision —the formation and retention of imagines— become the task of 
imaginatio in later mcdieval schemes. 2 0 Llull clearly regarded this tradi-
tional tripartite scheme as authoritative, and its three-fold division was 
essential to his "trinitarian world-picture". 2 1 The clear definition of an in-
termediate stage between sensation and intellection especially facilitates 
" E.g. Libre de contemplacio 40 .1 (OE 2: 182a) . 
** Since Llull's habit of not citing other authorities makes it difficult to identify specific 
"sources" for his arguments, subsequent discussions of Aristotelian doctrines simply give 
references to the relevant loci in the Philosopher's works, using these abbreviations: 
Cat.= Categoriae; De an.= De anima; De part. an. = De partibus animalium; De interp. = 
De interpretatione; Ilist. an. = Historia animalium. All references employ book, chapter, 
and Bekker numbers as given in The Complete Worfcs of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) . Perarnau's 
notes throughout his edition of Lo sise seny offer some suggestions regarding particular 
later medieval authorities that LIull might have read. 
19 De anima 1 .5 , ed. Simone Van Riet, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J . Brill, 1972) 1: 79-102. 
On Aviccnna's scheme, see E. Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the 
Sfiddle Ages and the Renaissance (London: The Warburg Institute, 1975) 40-1. The De 
anima was already available in Latin in the twelfth century, and soon afterwards in ver-
nacular versions as well: see J . Homer Herriott, "The Ten Senses in the Siete Partidas", 
Uispanic Review 20 (1952 ) : 269-81 . 
™ De Genesi ad litteram libri XII 12.6-9, Patrologia Latina 34 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 
1887) cols. 245-486 (at cols. 458-61) . On LlmTs debt to Augustine in general, see Victor 
Capanaga, "San Agustin y el lulismo", Augusfinus 21 (1976) : 3-15. 
" E.g. Richard of St. Victor, Benjamin minor 14, Patrologia Latina 196 (Paris: 
J.-P. Migne, 1880) cols. 1-64 (at col. 10); Alcher of Clairvaux, De spiritu et anima 11, 33 , 
Patrologia Latina 40 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1887) cols. 779-832 (at cols. 786-7, 802-3) ; or 
Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon 2.4-5, ed. Charles H. Buttimer fWashington, DC: Catholic 
University of America, 1939) 27-9. These chapters of Hugh's widelyread text describe the 
organization of the human soul and body according to schemes of triple and quadruple 
faculties that merit comparison to Llull's own system. On all these schemes, see Robert 
Javclet, Psychologie des auteurs spirituels du XII' siccte (Strasbourg: Societe Nouvelle 
d'Impression, 1959) esp. 8, 119-20. References to an intermediary level of spiritual senses 
between the corporal senses and intellect already appear in Patristic writings: sec e.g. Karl 
Rahner, "Le debut d'une doctrina des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene", Revue d'ascetique 
et de mystique 13 (1932) : 113-45. 
" As explained by R. D. F. Pring-Mill. "The Trinitarian World-Picture of Ramon Lull", 
Romanistischcs Jahrbuch 7 (1955-56) : 229-56. 
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Llulls explanation of a modtts naturalis intelligendi that would lead read-
ily to recognition of spiritual truths from material knowledge. At the 
same time, traditional niedical doctrincs also defined an intennediate posi-
tion for the organs of imagination within the structure of the brain,--
which Llull also mentions.2 1 1 
VVith respect to affatus, the most important feature of the Avicennan 
scheme is its division of the operations of the sensitivc soul into two broad 
categories: movement and apprehension.-4 Movemcnt includes both appc-
tite or the stimulus to movement and muscular activitv or the mcchanism 
of movement.Apprehension includes the five commonly recogni/cd ex-
ternal senses and five internal senscs: sensus communis, imagination, cogi-
tation, estimation, and memory. 2" Most Scholastic authorities base their 
elassifications on Avicenna's.-7 The distinction between these powers never 
plays a major rolc in LIull's theories, however. From the beginning of his 
career, he distributes the functions of the apprehensive power betwecn 
thc imaginative and sensitive souls and consequently never cmploys the 
apprehensive power as a functional division in his psychological model. 
His recognition of the motive power as a separate level of soul with 
distinct functions gradually diminishes, and ceases altogether by 1924. 
A brief review of his remarks on the functions of the motive and apprehen-
sive powers will readilv show the evolution in his definiton of each. 
The term apprehensivus rarely appears in LhuTs writings.-* Whcn 
Llull mentions the apprehensive powers at all, he attributes them to the 
" Harvey Inward Wits 55 . 
" Libcr novus physicorum 3.3 (ROL 6 : 7 8 ) ; Libre de anima racional 2.7.6. (OHL 
2 1 : 206) . 
" De anima 1.5 (ed. Van Riet 1: 79-102) . 
a Bishop Maura felicitiously suggested a conncction hetwecn uffatus and "miiscular 
scnsitivity" ("Verbo sensible" 68) . Although he explaincd it by appealing to modrm me-
dical theories, it is tempting to imagine that his Neoscholastic training cnabled this insight, 
which no subsequent scholar pursued, even though Scholastic accounts of thc motive powcr 
include, as we will see, a close parallcl to LlulTs ttffatus. 
" De anima 1.5. 
1 7 E. g. Aquinas la .78,4 . All references are by part ( la , 2a2ae, etc.) and question to 
Summa Tlieologiae, 6 0 vols., Blackfriars Edition (New York: McGraw-HiU, 1961-76 ' . 
Cf. Vincent of Beauvais, Sneciilum nnturole 25 .1 . Ml reicrenccs iv\o.\eale YxmV ar\t\ eVvavitct 
from Bihliotheca mundi, 4 vols. (Douay, 1624 , Rprt. Gra7.: Akademische DmcV. v. Ver-
lagsanstalt, 1964) . Most of Vincent's matcrial comcs from John of La Rochcllc's Tractatus 
ilc divisione multiplici poteniiarum unimae, cd. Picrrr Michnud-Ounntin (Paris: J. Vrin 
1964) . Peramau cites John's famons work as an rxamplr of the more sophisticntcd analy-
ses of the soul pursued by LHilTs Scholastic contemporaries. but dors not nolicr JohvTs 
,^'immnries of views rcgarding thc motive power of the scnsitivc soul ("Lo sisc seny" 
48-50) . 
2 8 See the scant entries in Mi(|uel Colom Mateu, Glossari ueneral luUiti, 5 vols. (Mn-
llorca: Moll, 1982-85) , s.v. 'aprcnsibilitat' and 'nprcnsiu'. 
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imagination. This reductive trcatment of apprehcnsion is critical to Llulls 
classification of speech among the senses, as we will see. 2 u The Libre cle 
contemplacio of 1273-74 does mention five "intellectual senses" —cogita-
tion, aperception, consciencc, subtlety, and courage (coratgia)— that large-
ly serve the needs of contemplation, but does not identify them with 
the imagination. 3 0 The Quaestiones per Artem demonstrativam solubiles 
of 1290-91 explain how the imagination in animals includes the powers 
of appetite, recollection, and estimation, but without distinguishing these 
as motive or apprehensive powers. 3 1 The discussion of imagination in the 
Arbre de ciencia of 1295-96 names no specific internal senses, although 
the operations that it performs do recall the apprehensive functions of 
fantasy, instinct, and memory. 3 2 Finally, the Liber de ascensu et descensu 
intellectus of 1305 does specifically note that in animals imagination com-
prises only the apprehensive, appetitive, and estimative powers, while in 
humans it includes fantasy and movement toward the desired sensorv 
object. 3 3 
The assignment of both appetite and motion to the imagination in 
the passage just cited illustrates the final result of Llulls gradual aban-
donment of the motive power as a separate level of soul. His earliest 
works do nonetheless clearly recognize a separate motive power. The 
account in the Libre de contemplacio is not complex: it includes the 
appctite and will as sensual and intellectual divisions, following the 
understanding of Aristotle accepted by his Scholastic contemporaries/14 
It also mentions locomotion briefly, but savs nothing about the muscles. 3 5 
The Doctrina pueril of 1282-83 offers a lengthv distinctio for the multiple 
spiritual and corporeal meanings of inoviment.™ The last of these is the 
motus that occurs in the operation of the five external senses. Llull still 
includes the motive power as a separate level in thc Libre cle meravclles 
of 1288-89, but defincs it simplv as the mutual interaction of the other 
lour levels of soul, which move one another just as the Divine Dignities 
" Maura also recognized thc importance of this treatmcnt ("Verbo sensible" 49-68) . 
" 193.5 <OE 2 : 567a) . 
« Qu. 176 (MOG 4 : 174a-175b). 
" 4.4.1 (OE 1: 609ab). 
• The "sensibilem appetitum": 5 .1 .10 , 6.4.1 (ROL 9 : 77, 95) . 
*' See 44 . 268 .27 (OE 2 : 191a-193b, 820a) . Cf. De an. 3 .9 432b6 and Aquinas 
la .80 2 or 82 .5 . 
» 44 .28 (OE 2 : 193b). 
» 92 (ORL 1: 179-81). Usc of distiiutiones is probably the most characteristic "scho-
lastic" fcature of Ramon LlulKs work and suits well his preference for analogical argu-
ment. On the theory and practice of this device, see J . B. Allen Ethical Poetic 142-51 and 
Richard H. and Mary A. Rouse. "Biblical Distinctiones in the Thirtcenth Century". Ar-
chives d'llistoire Doctrinale et Litlcrairc du Moycn Age 41 (1974) : 27-37. 
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coessenlially interact." In the Arbre de ciencia, howcver, the sensual 
appetite becomes an opcration of the vegetative souI, :'8 while thc intellec-
tual appetite becomes an operation exercised jointly by the three facultics 
of the mind.88 In the Liber novus phtjsicorum of 1310 and Liber lamen-
tationis philosophiae of 1311 the motive sensitive power is simply one 
among many modes of the natural motion (motus) that occurs in thc 
change from potentiality to actuality. 4 0 
Although Llull never fully recognizes the apprehensive power and 
eventuallv discards the motive power altogether, he nonetheless incor-
porated their component functions among his divisions of sensitive and 
imaginative souls. In the case of the motive power, the reclassification of 
its functions may well have provided the opportunity to "discover" affatus. 
VVe have seen that Avicenna's scheme lists voice as a function of the 
motive power, because the production of vocal sounds requires the mo-
vement of muscles, nerves, and vocal cords. Thus, Vincent of Beauvais 
explains how the motive power's virtus vocativa emits sounds, has the 
lungs as its organ, and serves the purpose of manifesting affectiones in 
the soul. 4 1 The association of voice and sensation was common in many 
ancient authorities. Aristotle himself treats speech with hearing in his 
review of the senses, and medieval commentators, alwavs attentive to 
such aspects of the forma tractatus, follow his order of presentation.4-
According to Diogenes Laertius, the Stoics listed speech, reason, the gen-
erative power, and the five senses as the eight parts of the soul. 4 3 Evident-
ly alluding to this doctrine, Tomas and Joaquim Carreras i Artau suggested 
that Llull's theory of affatus derived from Stoic theories. 4 4 Llull's direct 
" 44 (OE 1: 393a) . 
w 2.3.1 (OE 1: 591a) . Compare thc similar revision describcd by Josep Maria Ruiz 
Simnn, "De la naturalesa com a mescla a l'art de mesclar (sobrc la fonamcnlacio cosmo-
logica de les arts luHianes)", Rarula 19 (1986) : 69-99 (at 87) . 
" 5.3.B.3 (OE 1: 625a-626b). 
" Dist. 3 (ROL 6 : 74-83) and Chap. 9 (ROL 7: 114-16) respcctively. 
11 Speculum naturale 25 .104 . 
12 De an. 2.8 420b5-la6 . On the commcntarics, scc Alastair J . Minnis, Medicittl 
Theortj of Authorship: Scholastic literartj attitudes in thc later Middle Ages (London: Scolar 
Press, 1983) 145-59. Pcrarnau cites various examples ("Lo sisc seny" 60) . 
" Vitae philosophorum 7.157, cd. R. D. Hicks (London: William Hcinemann, 1925) 261 . 
" Arbre de cidncia 3 .3 .6 (OE 1: 599n23, 1041) . Anthony Bonner notes that Sencca 
(Epistulae 117.13) and Cicero (Academica 2 .29.95) l>oth use the term cffatum to translatc 
the Stoic term itxioma (EL 25 (1981- 8 3 ) : 280) . Howevcr, axioma indicates the cnuntiatum 
or logical proposition, not the power of spccch. On thc logical and linguistic theorics of tlie 
Stoa, see Edward Vernon Arnold, Roman Stoicism (New York: Humanities Press, 1958) ; 
Marc Baratin, "L'identite de la pensee et de la parole dans 1'Ancicn Stoicisme", Signi-
fication et r6f6rence dans Vantiquitc ct au moyen dtie, Spccial Issue of LangttKCs 65 (Mnr 
1982) : 9-21; A. C. Lloyd, "Grammar and Mctaphysics in the Stoa", Problems in Stoicism, 
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access to Stoic texts is bistorically improbable, but various early medieval 
VVestern and Islamic authorities do cite them. Chalcidius mentions the 
vocalis substantia in his widely read Cornmentarius on Plato's Timaeus.47' 
The encyclopedic Rasa'il of the Ikhwan al-Safa lists five corporeal and 
five spiritual (internal) senses: imagination, cogitation, memory, speech, 
and production. A scheme apparently adapted from the Rasa'il appears 
in the widely-circulated Picatrix: in this work speech is one of seven 
powers of feeling or perception. 4" A more influential Stoic doctrine was 
the theory of pneuma, which passed chiefly through Galen to medieval 
authorities. Some of these, evidently following Haly Abbas, distinguish 
three spirits —the natural, vital, and animal— that join the soul to the 
body. 4 7 Thus, Alcher of CIairvaux's widely diffused De spiritu et anima 
explains how the vis animatis is located in the brain and causes the opera-
tion of the senses, movement of the limbs, and production of vocal sounds. 4 8 
These ancient and mcdieval doctrines associating speech and the senses 
provided the premises, but not the precise "source" for Ramon Llull's 
proposal of speech as a sixth sense called affatus. The "discovery" of the 
sixth sense still faccd the taxonvmic problem of placing the power of 
speech within his psychologieal model. We have seen that voice was 
often associated with the motive functions of the sensitive soul and the 
belief that all humans and animals make sounds necessarily implied that 
speech must derive from the sensitive or imaginative povvers that thev 
both possess.4" Llull, of course, did not explicitlv recognize the apprehcn-
sive powers and eventuallv abandoned the motive power as a separate 
level of soul. He assigns manv of the apprehensive and motive functions 
to his imaginative soul and only recognizes the five external senses as 
povvers of the sensitive soul. Consequently, anv other function — such as 
speech — that he associates vvith the sensitive soul vvould also receive the 
cd. A. C. Lloyd (London: University of London and The Athlone Prcss, 1971) 58-74 ; 
A. C. Lloyd, "Language and Thought in Stoicism", ibicl. 75-113 ; and Bcnson Mates, Sfoic 
Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961) . 
i:> Timacus it Catcidio tmnslatus commentarioque instructus 220 . ed. J . H. VVaszink, 
Plato Latinus 4 (London: Warburg Institute, 19621 232 . 
See John Dagcnais, "Origin and Evolution of Ramon LIuITs Theory of Affatus" 
Actes del Tercer CoHoqui d'Estudis Catalans a Nord-Amcrica, ed. Patricia Boehne et al. 
(Montserrat: Publicacions de 1'Abadia, 1983) 107-21, at 111. On the terminological con-
lusion in thc schcmc of thc Rasa'il. see Henry A. Wolfson. "The Intcrnal Senses in Latin. 
Arabic. and Hebrew Philosophic Texts", Harvard Philosophical Review 28 (1935) : 69-133. 
" See Harvey Inuard Wits 7, 62n22. 
" 22 (PL 4 0 : 7 9 5 ) . Perarnau suggests a single linc from AIcher's treatise as a possible 
inspiration ("Lo sisc* semj" 59-60) but LlulTs classification of affatus among the senses 
ncccssarily dcpcnds on furthcr distinctions than thosc available from the Galenic schcmc. 
'* As Pcrarnau notcs "Lo sise seny" 53 . 
12 M. D. JOHNSTON 
designation of external sense. Thus, we can understand Llulls j)roposal 
as a result of this redistribution of apprehcnsive and motive functious 
within his basic model of human nature. Still, to us moderns, the mcre 
possibilitv of classifving speech as an external scnse mav hardly justify 
doing so. In ordcr to understand how spcech functions as a sense, we 
must examine carefully the physiological and psychological functions that 
Llull attributes to affatus. 
Opcration of affatus among the senscs 
Llull's explanations of how affatus functions rely upon thc same phy-
siological and psychological doctrines that cxplain the operations of tha 
other senses. The doctrines that Llull adapts are not in themselves diffi-
cult to understand. Although his presentation of them continuously increases 
in elaboration throughout his career, they nonetheless remain founded on 
the broadly Neoplatonic axiom of "like knows like" and therefore rarely 
engage the specifically Aristotelian questions of causal order that exercised 
his Scholastic eontemporaries. r ,° An excellent example of his argument 
appears in his account of vision."'1 Like all ancient and medieval authorities, 
Llull describes vision most fully, stating explicitlv in his Arhre de cien-
cia that it provides a paradigm for understanding all the other senses. 5-
Virtually all of Llull's later writings on psychology explain sensation and 
cognition through the operation of the "innate correlatives" of essential 
activitv, passivit\r, and act that he considered fundainental constitutents 
of all beings. r , : l Thus, visual scnsation begins with thc individual and actual 
passive correlative "visibility", which exists in the thing seen and parti-
cipates formallv with the general and potential passive correlative "visi-
bilitv" existing in the eves. The external "visibility" is first "digestcd" into 
m Sce e.g. thc development of his argumcnts from thc Libre ilc contcmiilticiti 41 .5 
IOE 2 : 184b) to the Libre de dnima racional. On thc principlc ol similc simili cognosci 
sce Aquinas la .75-79 and esp. 85 ,2 on the antiqui and Platonici. 
n See LA 282-3 ; cf. SS 67-113. Cf. Arbre de sciencia 3.3.1 (OE 1; 596b-97b). 
°* 3.3.1 (OE 1: 597b). The Westcrn philosophical tradition has long associatcd esscntial 
nature and visible image as forma or eidos. Sce Jacques Derrida, "Whitc Mythology: 
Mctaphor in the Text of Philosophy", Netv Literanj History 6 (1974) : 5-74 (at 54) . 
•* See, for example. Liber lamentationis philosopbiae 7 (flOL 7: 110-121; De refuuio 
intellectus (ROL 11 : 2 4 7 ) ; Liber de perversione entis removendu 7 (ROL 5 : 486-7) ; or 
Liber correlativorum innutorum 9 (ROL 6 : 149-50). On thc importancc of the correlatives 
in I.lnir.s gnoseology. see Ruiz Simon "Dc ln naturalcsa com a mescla" 83 . The fnnda-
mental study of LluH's doctrinc of innatc corrclatives is Jordi Cayn Estelrich, La teoria 
luliana de los corrclativos (Palma dc Mallorca, 1979) . 
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the internal "visibility" by the vegetative power (which the higher sensi-
tive power virtually comprehends)/'4 When the active correlative "visit-
ivity" takes up this "visibility" the correlative act of vision and the sensa-
tion itself are complete. The complementary operation of the correlatives 
in the reception of sensible forms ultimately performs the role of the 
spiritual immutation described by Aquinas.""' More importantly, the active 
"visitivity" defines a variety of sensas agens similar at least in principle 
to that recognized by some of his Scholastic contemporaries. 5" One of 
the few mentions of Llull in contemporary Scholastic literature is in fact 
a refutation of affalus as a sensus agens, by Bartholomew of Bruges/'7 
As Perarnau perspicuously observes, the definition of active and passive 
correlatives for every sense certainly serves to assimilate the almost wholly 
active operation of affalus to the largely passive operations of the other 
five senses/'8 In Llull's system, all the senses become both active and 
passive through his correlatives. 
Llull imitates contemporarv Scholastic accounts of sensation that de-
fine a "medium", "organ" (or "instrument"), and "object" for each sense 
power. 8 9 The Liber cle affatu specifies the object and instrument or organ 
of every sense faculty."" At the same time, Llull departs radically from 
customary doctrine by disregarding entirely the definition of a sensorv 
medium and attributing instead to all the senses the extramissional "line" 
of sensation usually associated with vision alone. According to the ancient 
theorv alreadv explained in Platos Timaeus, vision occurs when the eye 
emits a ray or line that contacts the object of sight/'1 Bv Llull's day, this 
cxplanation was ceding to the new optic theories of Alhazen.'12 The tra-
** Many of the authorities eompiled by Vincent of Beauvais offer organic cxplanations 
of sensatinn (e.g. SfMCultMI naturale 25.101. However, the digestive role assigned to the 
vcgctative power in the interaction of internal and cxtcmal correlatives is peculiar to Llull. 
It illustrates well the role in his Art of the "elemental exemplarism" dcscribcd by Ruiz 
Simon, "De la naturalcsa com a mesela", 72, 90 . 
» la .78 ,3 . 
M See Stuart MacClintock, Perversity und Error: Studies on the "Averroist" ]ohn of 
Jundun (Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1956> 10-50. 
B T See Auguste Pelzer, tttudes dliistoirc litteraire sur la scolastique mcdievale (Paris: 
] . Vrin. 1964) 532 . 
" "ho sise seny" 53-4. 
• On thc designation of organ as instmment, see e.g. Vincent of Beauvais Spcculum 
naturale 25 .24 , 59 , 62, or 64. For typical bricf accounts of sensation. see e.g. Aquinas 
la.78.1 and 3 or Vinccnt of Beauvais Speculum naturale 25 .25 . 
*° Peramau sees a "distincio bcn conereta" berween organ and instmment in thc treatise 
("Lo sise seny" 6 4 . with refercnce to LA 2 9 6 ; cf. SS 460) . In fact Llull docs nnt dis-
tinguish organ and instrumcnt for touch, vision, or hearing. 
45B-46A. 
** Sce David C. Lindberg. Theories of Vision from Al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1976) 104-21. 
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ditional ancient and medieval authorities compiled by Vincent of Beauvais 
mention this line onlv in the sense of vision. , ! : 1 Some explicitly deny that 
any sense besides vision functions in a direct line; they especially notc 
the circular propagation of sound waves. 0 4 Llull nonetheless attributes 
this line to each sense, 0 B comparing its conductive power to the mast of 
a ship or a hollow tube (in the case of hearing)."" His extrapolation of 
this extramissional Hne to the ojierations of all the senses reveals the 
power of his analogizing procedures of exposition, which readily rework 
the tenets of received doctrine. It also solves the widely-debated problem 
of explaining the projection of sensible species through intervening sj>a-
c e . 0 7 Llull's arguments evidentlv acknowledge these questions. For exam-
ple, the Liber dc affatu specifies no line for taste, just as Aristotle states 
that taste has no medium. 6 8 On the other hand, in the case of touch it 
defines flesh as its organ and specificallv describes a Hne of sensation as 
the medium of touch."" This is the only explicit definition of a medium 
in the Liber de affatu. Aristotle posed for later authorities the question 
of whether flesh is the organ or medium of touch, 7 0 and Llulfs account 
apparently confronts this issue. 
Finallv, where other medieval authorities attributed to each scnse 
power a single predominant element, 7 1 Llull argues that the sense object, 
the line of sensation, and the eves possess all four elements, as well as 
vegetative and sensitive natures. 7- In the case of smell he does note that 
the element air predominatcs in this linc, 7' 1 and air is the medium of 
smell recognized by Aristotelian commentators. 7 4 Since all entities in the 
hierarchy of being participate in the levcls of being or natures inferior 
to them, this line allows the elemental, vegetal, and sensual natures of 
the eyes to participatc with thosc of the pcrceivcd object "by cont-
iguitv".7-"' Consequentlv, vision "attains in its own visibility the visibilitv 
appropriated from without, with these two visibilities participating to-
• Speculum nattirale 25.9-83. 
" See Perarnau "Lo sise sentj" 70-1. 
• LA 282-6 ; cf. SS 68-196 . Cf. Arbre de ciencia 3.3 (OE 1: 596a-99b>. 
« LA 2 8 4 ; cf. SS 129-38. 
"* See Perarnau's excellent discussion ("Lo sisc scntj" 65-9. with refcrence to lines 
67-113) . 
• LA 2 8 5 ; cf. SS 164-78. Cf. De an. 2 .10 4 2 2 a l 6 . 
• LA 2 8 6 ; cf. SS 185-90. 
*» De an. 2.11 422b20-22 ; cf. Vincent of Beauvait, Speculum naturalc 25 .79 81 . 
" Sce Perarnau, "Lo sise" senij" 66 . 
n Arbre de ciincia 3.31 (OE 1 : 596b-97b). 
• LA 284-5 ; cf. SS 149. 
'« See Pirarnau "Lo sise seny" 72. 
™ Arbre de ciencia 3. Prol., 3.3.1 ( 0 £ 1: 594ab, 597a) . 
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gether in species and sustained in one single line of elements stretched 
between the forms"; that is, "berween both forms stands the line of ele-
ments, similary formed and subject to vision". 7'' Although this passage 
employs Llull's correlatives, it also shows how his model of sensation still 
assumes the "elemental exemplarism" found in earlier redactions of his 
system. 
II we turn now to LlulTs accounts of how speech functions as a sixth 
sense, we find that this model can only accommodate with difficulty the 
functions of affatus. The difficulty ultimately arises from the divergence 
between the exteroceptive operation of the five external senses and the 
interoceptive operation of LlulLs sixth sense. To fully understand affatus 
we must, as will become evident, regard it as a process of communication 
among the extemal and internal senses. In order to see how affatus func-
tions in this fashion, we will trace the process of affatus through each 
stage that Llull seems to recognize in its operation as a sense. His various 
accounts of affatus suggest four principal stages: 1) the generation of 
concepts or desires as mental objects for affatus; 2) the apprehension of 
those objects by affatus; 3) expression of these objects by affatus in speech; 
and finally; 4) the reception of speech by hearing. 7 7 Our exposition of these 
stages collates remarks about affatus with others on language found in 
works written throughout LIulI's career. Although this procedure neces-
sarily includes some inconsistent or confusing elaims, it nonetheless usefully 
shows how Llull's proposal of speech as a sixth sense develops within a 
context of related doctrines. For each stage we will consider the conven-
tional tenets of medieval physiological or psvchological doctrines that he 
adapts, and then examine how that adaptation serves his definition of 
speech as a sense. 
Stage One: Gencration of Concepts. To begin with, affatus transmits 
both thoughts and desires. These correspond broadlv to the objects of 
the intellective and sensitive appetites. 7 S Llull generallv refers to these 
thoughts and desires with the eomprehensive term "internal conceptions", 
in the manncr of a traditional general category such as affectus animae.19 
Perarnau suggests that "internal conception" means either desires or 
~* "Visitivum attingit in sua propria visibilitate visibilitatem de foris appropriatam. par-
ticipantibus ipsis duabus visibilitatibus simul in specie sustentatis in linea una cadcm ele-
mentata inter figuras terminata;" "inter ambas figuras stat linea elemcntata, modo simili 
figurata, subjectata ipsi videre" (LA 282-3 ; cf. SS 82-6 and 89-91) . 
n These four stages effectively invert the process through which the other five senses 
operate. For diffcrcnt schematizations of thc opcration of affatus, sce Perarnau ("Lo sise 
seny" 42) and Tusqucts ("Lcnguaje como argumento" 178-9). 
n Cf. Aquinas la .80 ,2 . 
" See Alcher De sviritu et anima 4 (PL 40 ; 782) . 
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thoughts, dej)ending on the eontext. 8 0 It seems more likely though that 
Llull seeks to maintain a single, generaJ object for affatus since this bettcr 
serves his identification of speech as a discrete sense and maintains the 
continuity that he posits betwcen the levels of soul in human beings.K 1 
LIulI rcpeatedly states that the purpose of affatus is to allow one animal 
to share its "internal conceptions" with anothcr animal. 8 3 This primary 
jmrjDose evidentlv justifies his definition of these as the formal and final 
cause of affatus.X{ Although many thoughts or desires j)resumably arise 
from sensations of the external world at large, Llull most often mentions 
only their appearance within the soul. Where humans possess both in-
tellective thoughts and imaginative desircs, animals jjossess only the 
Iatter. S 4 Drunks and fools speak without using thcir imaginations at all. s" 
All these remarks assume Aristotelian doctrine. 8 n 
Llull's accounts of how these concepts arise draw especially on various 
clements of traditional physiological lore. He explains that thoughts arise 
in the heart and brain of those animals that have hearts, and in the brain 
alone of those that lack hearts. S T This claim derives from various Aristo-
telian teachings, well-known from Avicenna and other authorities. s s LIuITs 
distinction between those animals that possess or lack hearts conflates two 
elements of Aristotelian biology: first, the division between nonsanguineous 
and sanguineous animals, all of which possess hearts and brains; s " second, 
the observation that all nonsanguineous and some sanguineous animals 
lack voices." 0 The Lectura super Artem inventivam exj)lains that speech 
better manifests what is conceived in autumm and summer than in winter, 
with the result that birds sing and people speak more joyfully in spring 
and summer."1 These comments evidentlv assume commonplace medical 
w "Lo sise seny" 89 , 9 4 . 
n As Perarnau recogniz.es, "Lo sisd seny" 64 . 
" E.g. LA 280, 293 , 2 9 6 ; cf. SS 12, 3 9 0 , 459 . Cf. Leclura tntpcr Artcm inveutivam 
ct Tabulam pcneralem 240 (MOG 5 : 325 . AI rcferencrs arc to questions from Pars 2 of 
Distinctio 3 ) ; Proverbis de Ramon 262.2-3 (ORL 14: 2 8 6 ) ; Arbre de chmcia 3 .3 .6 (OF. 
1: 599ab). 
"" Lectura 239 . 
M LA 280 , 2 9 4 ; cf. SS 14, 419 . Cf. Arbre de ciencia 1.7.89 (OE 1: 587b) ; Arbre tle 
filosofia desiderat 1.3.17 (ORL 17: 4 2 1 ) ; Lectura 2 4 0 ; Proverbis de Ramon 184.12 (OHL 
14: 197) and Arbre de ciencia 16 .7 .366 (OE 1 : 1024a). 
" LA 2 9 5 ; cf. SS 4 3 8 . 
w De an. 2.8 420b33 and 3.3 427b6-8bl7 . 
" Lectura 244. 
" De an. 5.8 (ed. Van Riet 2 : 174-85). Cf. tlie texts summarized bv Vincent of Beau-
•vais Svcculum naturale 21 .2 ,6 ,26-8 . 
• llist. an. 1.16, 2.5 4941)26. 506a5 . 
m De an. 2.8 420b7-10. 
n Lectura 243 . 
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theories regarding the interaction of physical environment and tempera-
ment. Contemporary authorities also adapted these to explain the hygienic 
and psychotherapeutic value of literature. 9-
In general, then, affatus provides both humans and animals with a 
means of communicating all those affectiones or passiones that arise in the 
sensitive, imaginative, or rational soul. 
Stage Two: Apprehension of Concepts. Next, affatus receives these 
thoughts or desires from the intellect or imagination, and thereby "con-
ceives" or "senses" them. n : i It thus performs an apprehensive function 
internally within the soul, which Llull habitually terms "conception". 9 4 
Llull emphasizes in the Liber cle affatu that whereas the other five senses 
apprehend external objects, affatus apprehends internal ones. 9 5 Despite 
the prominent role that Llull's correlatives play in his accounts of other 
senses, only once does he fully explain this internal apprehension with 
them: affatus conceives exterior "conceptibilities" with its natural, bodi-
ly affative "conceptive" and own affable "conceptible", and these parti-
cipate in species with the interior "conceptible", and thus affatus moves 
the tongue and speech to manifest externally what was conceived in-
ternally.*"1 The reference to conceiving exterior "conceptibilities" evidently 
indicates the apprehension of external forms. Better understanding of this 
internal conceptio or apprehensio will be possible once we come to con-
sider the rolc of affatus as mental discourse. 
Stage Three: Expression or Manifestation of Concepts. After appreh-
ending or conceiving thoughts and desires, affatus then manifests them 
externallv through vocal sounds. 
Llull's explanation of voice again includes various elements taken 
from medieval medical doctrine, and notablv more than appear in his 
" On these theories, see the excellent study by Clending Olson, Literature as Recrca-
tion in the Later Middle Ag.es (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1982. 
" E.g. Lectura 244 . Perarnau believes that the vernacular "sent" means "fer scnsi-
ble" in the following passage from the vernacular version: "car sent la manifestatio de 
la conceptio, coue que sia distinccio enfre £!a e la coneeptio, car si no u era no seria 
migiu qui scntis la eonccptio" (SS 4 2 4 ; "Lo sise seny" 91) . The Latin text gives "sentit" 
(LA 294) . 
" LlulTs rccourse to verbal analogy appears explicitly in his cxplanation that the sen-
sitive soul presents instincts to the imagination just as "la fembra qui conccp infant imprem 
cn aquell alguna semblanca de 1'object que imagina; e ac6 mateix del mascle" tArbre de 
ciencia 16 .7 .366 ; OE 1: 1024a). The dual sense of 'conception' ("conceive a thought" 
vs. "conceive a child") allows a eomparison of mental and bodily operations that effecti-
vely explains both operations through appeal to a single relationship, the communication 
of a likeness. 
" E.g. LA 289, 2 9 0 ; cf. SS 271 , 287-8, 297-8. 
" Lectura 246 . 
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earlier writings. In the Libre de contemplacio, he explains simply that 
words and cries result froin things moving, touching, speaking, crying, 
or sounding, following the Aristotelian axiom that noise occurs when onc 
object strikes another. 0 7 He mentions also that the tongue and lips serve 
as organs of articulation, and his remarks recall the descrijitions of voicc 
found in basic school texts. 0 8 
The Liber de affatu of 1294 and contemporary writings offer so much 
more detail regarding the physiology of speech that it is difficult to resist 
the conclusion that Llull had gained some new familiaritv with texts 
from the medieval medical tradition. 0 0 Still, his accounts are undcniably 
idiosyncratic, eclcctic, and synthetic. His model of the cumulative levels 
of being organizes his explanation of the sixth sense, as it does all thc 
senses, in the Arbre de sciencia: air provides vocal sound (i.e. as the con-
tribution of the elemental level of being) the vcgetative power providcs 
the pleasure desired in the species (of the things) communicated, while 
the sensitive power provides the act of sensation. 1 0 0 Moreover, the object, 
medium, and organ of affatus are necessarilv Llull's own invention. Hc 
always identifies the manifestation of internal conceptions as the object 
of affatus.un However, the definitions of organ and instrument are less 
consistent, naming variously the tongue, speech, and their "movement". 1"-
Most of his writings describe this movement as the passage of air from 
the lungs and out of the mouth, following Aristotle's explanation of how 
speech sounds arise. 1 0 3 More remarkable is the quasi-Pvthagorean expla-
" 125.1 (OE 2 : 374a) ; cf. Libre de demostracions 1.49 (ORL 15 : 48) . De an. 2.8 
419b3-420b4. Sce Perarnau "Lo sis£ seny" 70 . 
« 125 .22 (OE 2 : 376a) . Cf. e.g. Boethius's 7n librum Aristotelis de Interprctationc 
Commentaria majora 1, Patrologia Latina 64 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1891) cols. 393-639 
(at col. 394AB). 
®° Most of these sources — Razes, Haly Abba, Costa bcn Lucca. Platearius, Constan-
tinus Africanus, and above all, Avicenna — were bascd ultimately on Aristntle and C.alcn 
(see Harvey Imeard Wits 28) . Moreover, their tcachings circulated widely in manuals such 
as the famous compendium prepared in 1301 by Bernard of Gordon for his mcdical stu-
dents at Montpellier; Bernard's text even appcarcd in vcrnacular translations. (Profcssnr 
Brian Dutton of the University of Wisconsin informs me that an cdition of a fourtecnth-
century Castilian version of Bernard's work is undcr way.) 
*» Arbre de sciencia 3 .3 .6 , 3.7 (OE 1 : 599a, 606b). 
1 0 1 E.g. LA 280 , 287, 290 , 2 9 6 ; cf. SS 18, 217, 3 0 0 . 471 . See also Arhre de riencia 
3.3.6 (OE 1 : 599a) ; Proverbis de Ramon 262 .3 (ORL 14: 2 8 6 ) ; Liber de praedictttionc 
2.B.1.36.2.1 (ROL 4 : 141). 
1 0* Contrary to Perarnau's claim "Lo sise seny" 9 4 . Cf. Arbre de. cidncia 3 .3.6. (OE 
1 : 599a) ; LA 296 (cf. SS 459-61) ; Proverbis de Ramon 184.8, 262.3-4 (ORL 14 : 197, 
2 8 6 ) ; Liber de praedicatione 2 .8.1.36.2.1 (ROL 4 : 141) ; Lectura 242 . 
,0* De an. 2.8 420b23-7. The Liber de affatu statcs that the intcrnal conception both 
'accipitur' in the lungs and 'formatur' in spcech (LA 290) . Hcncc, Perarnau concludcs that 
the lungs are the physical location in which formal conception and matcrial airstream unite 
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natiun of sound in the Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus, which 
notes that the heavens cause vowels or consonants in sound with their 
harmony or melody. 1 0 4 
The "line" of sensation for affatus is the motus that begins in the 
membris sensatis (i.e. lungs, tongue, and palate) and pars, in qua non est 
sensata (i.e. speech). 1" 5 This division between "sensate" and "insensate" 
parts combines several Aristotelian arguments: the claim that only the 
sanguineous parts of animals possess sensation; 1 0 , 1 the description of the 
organs of speech; 1 0 7 and remarks on the relations between the heart and 
the lungs. 1 0* The trajectory of this line seems directly depcndent on the 
conception of affatus as a version of the virtus vocativa of the motive 
power. This line presumably allows, by virtue of its comprehensive com-
position, the same interaction bctween affatwi and its object as it does 
for vision and its object. Thus, the Liber de affaiu describes this line as 
both elementata and sensata.1"0 More importantly, it connects the corre-
lative "sensitive" and "sensible", that is, the conception and its vocal 
manifestation. 1 1 0 It joins the mind, mouth, and speech, Llull claims, be-
cause the intellect has an apprehensive nature, which is thus able to 
participate and join with thc sixth sense. 1 1 1 Vincent of Beauvais argues 
against certain unnamed authorities who maintained that imaginable and 
intelligible species are born directly from the anterior ventricle of the 
head to the tongue and vocal organs by means of a nerve descending 
from the inner chamber of the brain. 1 1- They thus attributed an active 
and motive function to a nerve that is actually passive and sensitive (or 
apprehensive) and serves only to convey the sensations of taste from the 
("Lo sise seny" 94 with reference to SS 460-2) . The variations in Llulfs other accounts 
of affatus make this difficult to establish. 
, < M 7.2.3 (ROL 9 : 110) . Tusquets notcs LlulTs subsequent qualifications to the apparent 
eelestial dcterminism suggested by this claim ("Lenguaje como argumento" 195-6). On 
1\ thagorean theorics of languagc, scc S. K. Ilcnningcr, Touches of Sueet Haimony: Pytha-
fjirean Cosmology ancl Renaissance Poetics (San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 
1974) . 
"» LA 2 9 6 ; cf. SS 463-70. 
•» De nart. ctn. 2 .10 6 5 6 b l 8 - 2 1 . 
De an. 2.8 420b5-21a5. 
K * De part. an. 3 .4 ,6 6 6 6 a l 2 - 1 5 , 6 6 9 a l 5 . The bcst single comprehensive source of all 
this Aristotciian lore rcgarding thc comparativc physiology of specch in humans and ani-
mals is Avicenna, De natura animalium 4 .1 , Opcra (Venice. 1508 ; rprt. Louvain: Biblio-
thcca Societatis Iesu, 1961) 33ra-b. Llull probably knew it from various encyclopedias or 
compcndia. 
"» LA 2 9 6 ; cf. SS 465 . 
Arhrc clc ciVnrio 3.3.6 (OE 1: 599a) ; cf. Lectura 2 4 1 . 
Lilier cle ascenxu rf desccnsu intcllcctus 3.2.6 (ROL 9: 49) . 
Cf. Speculum naturale 25 .71 . 
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tongue to the mind. 1 1 : i Like Aristotle and his commentators, Llull notes 
that the tongue is the organ of both taste and speech. 1 1 4 This common 
function evidently reinforced a parallel between taste and speech as facul-
ties of sense apprehension. 
All these explanations of the vocal manifestation of concepts through 
affatus imply the existence of separate phonic and semantic aspects in 
speech, even if Llull does not distinguish them very precisely. In regard 
to the phonic component, he states that the locutive power informs (s))e-
cificat) sound and moves the instrument where voice is f o r m e d ; 1 1 5 speech 
is informed by or from sound; 1 1 , 1 the manifestation occurs through sound 
informed in voice or s p e e c h ; 1 1 7 the concept extracts speech from sound 
materially and affatus gives itself the specified form of s p e e c h ; 1 1 8 and 
finally, the tongue artificialiter disposes sound, just as affatus naturally 
causes voice. 1 1 9 AIl these statements regarding specificatio attempt to de-
fine the informatio of the matter of vocal sounds with the forms of words 
(regarded as intelligible species). Where the speculative grammarians treat 
this hylemorphic relationship strictly, 1 2 0 Llull does so more loosely and 
is thus better able to develop his new theory. Thus, the Liber de ascensu 
et descensu intellectus explains that affatus imposes names on things, as-
signs predicates to subjects, and proffers discrete and continuous syllables 
as forms of particular or universal concepts. 1- 1 This last remark and similar 
ones in the Proverbis de Ramon rehearse Aristotle's examples of quantitv 
in language, correlating them with the equally fundamental logical distinc-
tion between particular and universal. 1 2 2 The elementarv nature of these 
m Speculum naturale 25 .26 . 
111 De an. 2.8 4 2 0 b l 7 ; De part. an. 2 .17 660a20-25 . LA 287, 2 9 4 ; cf. SS 221 , 401-8. 
Proverbis de Ramon 262 .4 (ORL 14 : 186) . Peramau notes that LlulTs comments on taste 
ignore various details of conventional doctrine ("Lo sisi semj" 78) . 
"» LA 2 8 0 ; cf. SS 22-23. 
» LA 290 , 293 , 2 9 6 ; cf. SS 3 0 1 , 387, 473 . 
n ' Lectura 238 . 
l u Ars iuris quae est de inventione mediorum juris civilis 5 .5, ed. E. Wohlhaupter, 
Estudis Franciscans 4 6 (1935) : 196-215 and 47 (1935) : 161-250 (at 47 : 196) . 
Metaphysica nova et compcndiosa 2.8.1 (ROL 6 : 51) . 
m See Geoffrey L. Bursill-Hall, Speculative Crammtirs of thc Middlc Ages (The Haguc: 
Mouton, 1971) 50-51. 
1 3 1 2 .2 .4 ; 6 .9 .10 (ROL 9 : 2 6 ; 104) . Tusquets claims that affatus employs only sounds 
without conceptual sense, while anothcr "habla racional" does employ sounds joined to 
concepts; "Lenguaje como argumento" 179-80. Given LluITs Hmited attention to the pro-
cesses of semiosis in his accounts of affatus, it scems optimistic to agrec with Tusquets 
that the sixth sense "vale para constrair una metafisica scmiAtica y la correspondiente npo-
log£tica"; ibid. 184. Such n judgcment npplies far better to the Liber de siunificatione 
(ROL 10: 1-100); see the author's The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1987) 163-75. 
™ 184.4-6, 17 (ORL 14 : 196-7). Cf. De interp. 7 17a35 and Cat. 6 4b30-5. 
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classifications demonstrates LluH's minimal concern for the material consti-
tuents of discourse. His interest lies almost exclusively in the spiritual 
objectives of communication. 
These objectives necessarily involve the semantic component of langua-
ge, which he usually identifies with the concept as intelligible species, 1 2 3 
form, 1 2 4 or simply likeness. 1 2 6 Although this terminology resembles that 
employed by Latin or Arab authorities, it is difficult to consider this 
explanation of how concepts "inform" speech as "purely formal" . 1 2 6 LlulFs 
fundamental "elemental exemplarism" just as readily favors organic analo-
gies for describing the process through which concepts "inform" speech: 
for example, affatus transmutes the concept into speech, just as the vege-
tative power does food and drink into flesh and blood. 1 2 7 These organic 
analogies not onlv explain the sfjecificatio of language, but also validate 
references to the physiology of speech elsewhere in Llull's analyses of 
affatus. 
Stage Four: Reception of Concepts. Finally, once speech achieves the 
manifestation of thoughts or desires in spoken words, the ears hear these 
words, according to the usual process for the reception of sensible species 
by the five external senses. Llull savs relatively little about this stage, 
but it is essential to his arguments regarding the communicative function 
of affatus. Especially notable is his observation that speakers hear the 
sounds emitted from their own mouths. The Arbre de ciencia explains 
that a roaring lion hears its own voice and the voice of others. 1 2 8 The 
Liber de affatu states somewhat obscurely that the "voice is received 
externally in the auditive power, which through its own correlative audi-
ble power offers to the inner manifestation a likeness of the eonception 
of the object created in the external manifestation". 1 2 9 It is important to 
note that this last passage does not clearlv distinguish between the audi-
tive power of the speaker and the auditive power of the listener. This 
E.g. LA 2 8 0 ; cf. SS 22-3. 
m E.g. LA 280 , 2 9 6 ; cf. SS 17, 4 7 3 . Llull often uses figuratum, meaning "given 
form" or "formed"; see Colom, Glossari 1 : 49 (s.v. affigurar). 
m E.g. LA 2 8 0 ; cf. SS 24-5. See also LA 2 9 6 (cf. SS 475) and Arbre de filosofia 
desiderat 1.3.17 (ORL 17: 421) . 
As Perarnau suggests "Lo sisd seny" 61 . Cf. Aquinas la .85 .2 ; Avicenna De anima 
5.6 (ed. Van Riet 2: 134-53) ; or the various authorities collected in Vincent of Beauvais 
Speculum naturale 27 .29-60. 
m Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus 7.2.3 (ROL 9 : 111) . 
"• 3.7 (OE 1 : 606b) . 
"* "Recipitur illa vox per auditivum extra, qui in suo proprio audibili dat conceptionis 
similitudinem objectae manifestationi interius, in manifestatione exterius affectatae" (LA 280) . 
Cf. SS 24-6. 
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slight ambiguity is perhaps purely coincidental, but nonetheless suggests 
a fundamental larger issue involved in Llull's proposal of speech as a 
sixth sense, namely the role of affatUS as a mode of internal comunica-
tion or "mental language" among the faculties of the soul. 
All the rcmarks collected in the preceding summary demonstrate that 
affatus conceives thoughts or desires from within the soul and then ex-
presses them orally in speech. Affatus is thus interoceptive, whcre thc othcr 
five senses are all exteroceptive. Most of LlulTs remarks on the opcration 
of affatus concern this intrasubjective function, rather than the intersub-
jective function of communication between speakers and listeners. This 
emphasis hardlv surprises: on one hand, the interoceptive function of 
affatus is certainlv its most novel feature, and therefore most in need of 
explanation; on the othcr, analyses of the perception of oral language 
more properlv pertain to accounts of the sense of hearing. Nonetheless, it 
is important to recognize that the proposal of speech as a sense depends 
far less on speech as a medium of communication among individuals than 
on sensation as a cognitivc operation of the individua! subject. If we turn 
now to consider carefullv how affatus fulfills this cognitive role, both its 
classification and operation among the other senses becomes far morc 
easily comprehensible. 
Affatus as oral and mcntal language 
We have seen already that Ramon Llulls "discovery" of affatus re-
sulted at lcst partiallv from a reclassification of the "inner scnses" defincd 
by Avicenna and based ultimately on Aristotelian theories. The scholastic 
psychology organized around such doctrines was, however, certainly not 
the only model of the soufs operations available to Llull. We havc also 
noted a better-known and more authoritativc scheme — the accounts of 
contemplation, inner vision, and meditation developed bv Patristic and 
Prescholastic writers. Fundamcntal to thcir inodels of these functions is 
the so-called "language of the mind" or "discourse of the soul". 1 ' 1 0 Exer-
cise of this function in affatus places LlulTs sixth sense in a tradition 
that ultimately remits to the Platonic "dialogue of the soul with itself". 1 '" 
m As a guide to rccent rcscarch on this topic, see Paul F. Gehl, "Mystical languagc 
models in monastic cducational psychology", Journal of Mcdiecal und Renaissance Studics 
14 (1984) : 219-43 and "Philip of Harveng on Silence", ProccedinRs of the Illinois Mc-
dieval Associittion, vol. 2, ed. Mark D. Johnston and Samuel M. Rilcy (Normal: Illinois 
State University. 1985) 168-81. 
m As Schastian Trias Mercant well obscrves El pcnsainicnto IJ la palabra 17. 
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For Christian theology the locus classicus regarding mental language was 
Augustine's famous account of the verbum quod intus lucet.132 For philo-
sophy and the arts a common authority was Boethius's analysis of the 
distinction berween written, oral, and mental orationes}™ The Schoolmen 
often describe the role of this mental discourse in faculty psychology. 1 3 4 
Allusions to this language of the mind appear in accounts of human 
psychology throughout Llull's early writings, 1 3 5 but the Quaestiones per 
Artem demonstrativam seu inventivam solubiles of 1290-91 offer an es-
pecially explicit description, suggesting its growing importance in his 
models of sensation and cognition. In this work, the motive power alreadv 
consists simply in the joint operation of the three mental faculties: when 
a person recalls something desirable, sensible species retained in the 
imagination move the imagination, the imagination the intellect, the int-
ellect the will to a purpose, the purpose the will, the will the intellect, 
and the intellect the imagination to imagine the thing desired. 1 3" Within 
this process, Llull recognizes two varieties of mental language: in the 
first, intellectual, speech is generated from intellectual images in order 
to attain intellectual objects, such as God, the divine attributes, angels, 
or the soul; in the second, sensual, speech is generated from sense ima-
ges in order to attain sense objects in the material world. In both cases 
the rational soul generates this inner speech in order to apprehend what 
is absent. 1 3 7 This kind of mental language constitutes the basis for commu-
nication behveen angels, as Llull explains in his Libre dels angels or De 
locutione angelorum.™9 The arguments of these works are conventio-
nal . 1 3 n The Medicina de peccat notes that devils who hear with spiritual 
1M De trinitate 9 .7.12, 15 .10.18, 15 .15 .25 , ed. W. J . Mountain, Corpus Christianorum 
50-50A (Turnholt: Brepols, 1968) 1: 3 0 4 ; 2 : 484-5 , 489-9. 
, M Jr» librum Aristotelis de Interpretatione 1 (PL 6 4 : 407 B). On the significance of Boe-
thius's formula, see Brian Stock, TJie Implications of Literacy: Written Language dnd Mo-
dels of Intcrpretation in tlie Eleventh and Ticelfth Centuries (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1983) 366-72 . 
1 5 4 E.g. Aquinas De differentia verbi divini et humani, ed. Raymundus M. Spiazzi, 
Opuscula philosophica (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1954) 101-2. Cf. also l a . 3 4 , 1 ; 79 ,11 
ad 3 ; 107,1 . George P. Klubertanz exhaustively analyzes the role of this discourse in 
Aquinas's scheme of the intemal senses: Thc Discursive Poiver: Sources and Doctrine of 
Vis Cogitativa Accorriing to St. Thomas Aquinas (St. Louis: Modern Schoolman, 1952) . 
, a E.g. Libre de contemplacio 126-7 (OE 2: 377a-81b) or Compendium Artis demonstra-
tivae 2 .1.5 (MOG 3 : 75b-76a). 
I W Qu. 175 (AfOG 4 : 89-90) . 
™ Qu. 54 (MOG 4 : 76 ) . 
I M Perarnau, rccognizing this conncction, happily included an edition of this previosly 
unpublished text as an appendix to his edition of the Catalan text ("Lo sise seny" 104-21). 
It now appears in ROL 16: 207-36. 
Cf. thc similar explanations of Aquinas la .107 . 
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ears tempt men not to praise God. 1 1 " As Joan Tusquets aptly indicates, 
this mental languagc completes a sort of communicative continuum, in 
which animals havc sound but no sense, angels sense but no sound, and 
huinans both sense and sound. 1 4 1 
The account in the Quaestiones per Artem clemonstrativam soluhilcs 
is especially notable for its use of the term phanlasias. Even though Llull 
employs this word interchangeably with species and similitudo, the role 
of these images in considering things absent from the senses clearly recalls 
one of the chief functions oi the imagination. LIull thus evidcntly assumes 
the conventional classification of the imagination as one of the internal 
senses within the apprehensive power of the sensitive soul, as described 
above. Bv attributins: to the intellectual and sensual divisions of mental 
speech the apprehensive functions normally assigned to the imagination, 
Llull describes one of the most important characteristics of affatus, namely 
its conception of thoughts and desires from thc intellective and sensitive 
souls. These two types of mental language already constitute an analogical 
application to spiritual speech of the distinction between sense and in-
tellectual knowledge. Only one further analogical step — the assimilation 
of corporeal sensation to spiritual cognition as common modes of "dis-
course"—would be necessary in order to create a single apprehcnsivc 
faculty of communication, namely affatus. 
It is perhaps hardly surprising that the Quaestiones per Artem cle-
monstrativam soluhiles is one of the last works in which Llull expounds 
the divisions of sensual and intcllectual speech. VVithin a few years, his 
sixth sense of affatus would define a mode of communication that embra-
ces both sensation and cognition, because it operates at two separate 
levels: on the one hand, it communicates with the higher faculties of 
imagination, vvill, reason, and mcmory; on the other hand, it communicatcs 
with its fellow external senses. Llull's accounts of the sixth sense usually 
treat each of these levels as a distinct function, since they correspond to 
separate corporeal and spiritual levels of cognition. If we examine how 
affatus communicates with each level, it becomes easy to see that LlulTs 
sixth sense organizes a comprehensive system of internal communication 
among the faculties of the sensitive, imaginative, and intellective souls. 
In its communication with the higher faculties, affatus plays an in-
strumental role. Llull explains that affalus and intcrnal concepts differ: 
the latter pcrtain to the intellect and imagination and the formcr to thc 
>» Line 3 4 1 2 (ORL 20 : 124) . Cf. likewise IJbre de meravelles 16 (OE 1: 348 ) . 
>" "Lenguaje como argumento" 173. 
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sensus communis. Therefore affatus serves as a mediator, conceiving im-
aginable or intelligible concepts and manifesting them in speech. 1 4- In-
deed, the operation of the imagination is better manifested through af-
fatus than any other sense. 1 4 : 1 At the same time, affatus also represents 
"corporeal delights" to the imagination, which in turn represents them 
to the soul. 1 4 4 Similarly, the sense of touch "manifests" its sensations to 
the imagination. 1 4 0 
One of the most quintessentially Lullian arguments of the entire Liber 
de affatu explains this function of affatus in the following sequence of 
propositions. 1 4 1 1 First, there is greater concordantia between a sensual and 
an intellectual power than between two sensual powers, because of the 
greater power that the intellectual possesses, as in the union of body 
and soul; here concordantia evidently indicates a relationship of necessarv 
dependence. Second, onlv affatus manifests the operations of memory, 
which is a facultv of the rational soul that informs the body; this claim 
embraces the unique role of affatus almost as a separate argument, while 
developing as well an argument about the dependence of sensual on 
intellectual powers. Third, if the sensus communis acquires virtus from 
the objects of memory, then it must do so through affatus and this virtus 
must be as great or greater than the virtus that the sensus communis 
receives from the other senscs. Finallv, if these conditions did not exist, 
the sensus communis would receive greater virtus from the other senses 
and would receive greater virtus from memorv through forgetting than 
through remembering, and these consequences are impossible. This con-
clusion requires, of course, the identification of forgetting as a lesscr 
virtus received from the facultv of memory. The exercise of affatus men-
tioned here is clearly not communication berween two separate persons. 1 4 7 
It is instead the interaction of the senses and rational soul. It is inter-
esting that this example does not mention the imagination, but rather 
attributes a mediating role to affatus and thus suggests how affatus func-
tions at the same level of internal senses as imagination. 
This intermediarv position creates relationships that are basically reci-
procal. For example, onlv affatus among the senses manifests the will, 
with the result that the will considers (se habet ad) the object of affatus 
>«• LA 2 9 4 ; cf. SS 418-25 . 
»« LA 2 9 0 ; cf. SS 297-8. 
i " Liber de praedicatione 2 .B.1.36.1 (ROL 4 : 142) . 
i« LA 2 9 4 ; cf. SS 403 . 
»« Thcse summarize LA 2 8 9 ; cf. SS 264-78. 
>«T As Peraman suggest "Lo sise seny" 8 1 , 83 . The vcrnacular text gives loqucio as 
the name of the speech powcr in this passage (SS 272) . 
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faster.1 4 8 Llull describes these processes most explicitly in tlic Liher cle 
ascenstt et clescensu intellectus, where he portrays all the soul's faculties 
as quasi-personifications. IIc tells how, when the scnses perceive particular 
stones, affatus speaks the universal term lapis, hearing receives that term, 
imagination imagines it, and thc intellect creates the genus stone. But if 
the intellect questions the real existence of this genus, then affatus "trulv 
declares that the genus is thus truly and reallv in the species of the stone, 
just as species are trulv and reallv in their individuals. And thus the 
intellect knows that affatus speaks the truth, with the aid of hearing and 
imagination". 1 4 0 In this assertion of a Realist understanding of the Trec 
of Porphyrv as cognitive rectituclo, both hearing and affatus act as spiri-
tual senses that work to rectifv the perceptions of the corporeal senses. , r > 0 
Llulls remarks on the interaction between affatus and the five othcr 
external senses use the relationship between speech and hearing as a 
paradigm. The interaction of the six external senses occurs through the 
scnsus communis, the power responsible for svnthesizing their disparate 
perceptions. Avicenna lists the sensus communis among the internal sen-
ses , 1 5 1 which correspond to LlulLs separate imaginative soul. Llull identi-
fies the sensus communis with the sensitve soul and hence affatus, like 
the other five senses, pertains to the essenee of the sensus communis.™-
He ignores, moreover, this power's function of organizing a common 
object from the various perceptions of the individual senses, and mentions 
instead only its function as source of the scnsitive capacity with which 
each sense grasps the objects "common" to i t . 1 M Thus, Llull notes that 
the objects of touch are things soft and rough, cold and wann, or hard and 
soft, i r ' 4 but without pursuing the question of the unity of the sense of 
touch. 1 5 5 Given this limited definition of the sensus commtinis, it is not 
suprising that Llull's explanation of how the sensus communis relates 
speech to the other senses is scarcely satisfying: 
l r t LA 289 ; cf. SS 287-8. Thc eomparative "faster" oddly implics that thc will pcrhaps 
considers objects from the other senses as well, but not as readily. 
H » " U c r e dicit, quod illud genus est ucre sic in speciebus lapidis realiter, sicut species 
snnt uere et realiter in stiis inidtiiduis. Et tunc intellecttts cognoscit, quod affatus dicit 
tientm, auditu adiuuantc ct ctiam imaginatione" (2 .9 .1 ; ROL 9 :41-2 ) . 
m Tusquets considers this quasi-personified account of faculty psychology to be a 
"radically semiotie" procedure of argumentation ("El lcnguajc como argumcnto" 199). 
, s l De anima 4.1 (ed. Van Rict 2: 1-11). 
, M LA 2 9 5 ; cf. SS 436 . Cf. Arbre de ciencia 3.2 (OE 1: 595b-596a) and LA 2 9 4 ; 
cf. SS 4 2 1 . 
LA 2 8 1 ; cf. SS 37-44. 
LA 2 8 1 ; cf. SS 43-4. 
, M As suggcsted by Perarnau "Lo shd seny" 63 . Aristotle's De anima (2.11 4221)19-
4 2 4 a l 4 ) treats in detai! thc problcm of thc divcrsity in tactilc scnsation. 
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fari de rebus placidis atque pulchris movet potentiam visivam 
ad videndum ipsas, adeo quod homo desiderat videre pulchritu-
dines rerum per affatum laudatarum, et conceptus illius placiti fit 
potius per vocis manifestationem, quae pulchra manifestat, quam per 
coloris modum; movet igitur citius potentia affativa oculos ad viden-
dum quam color, qui est objectum visus, et quia causa est ante 
effectum, in isto motu oportet quod, si est causa, de necessitate sit 
effectus, et hoc convertitur; oportet igitur quod de necessitate sit 
potentia affativa pars sensus communis, sine qua oculi non posset appe-
titum habere naturalem ad videndum pulchra, quia non esset qui eis 
revelaret vel manifestaret res pulchras et placidas ad videndum, cum 
oculi non participent cum conceptu intra, quem conceptum in voce 
manifestat potentia affativa; et illa manifestatio est suum objectum, 
et vox est objectum illius auditus, qui movet oculos ad videndum 
pcr pulchritudines manifestatas in voce; est igitur affatus sensus de 
necessitate propter hoc, ut ipse et auditus possint movere oculos ad 
appetitum naturalem in videndo pulchra. 1 5 0 
LlluTs initial remarks here on how one person's speech moves another 
person to desire perception of an object are largely unremarkable. He 
makes similar claims for the power of speech to move the sense of touch. 1 5 7 
However, his deduction that this influence requires the direct affiliation 
of speech and hearing in the sensus communis embraces several assump-
tions that appear extremelv unorthodox, if not indefensible, within the 
context of received medieval doctrines regarding sensation and cogni-
t ion. 1 5 S First, it conflates the motive and apprehensive functions of the 
scnsitive soul. Second, it apparentlv ascribes the motive function to the 
sensus communis. Third, it reverses the usual sequence of sensation and 
desire, or rather assigns to affatus a paramount role in presenting objects 
to the appetite and will. Fourth, it implies that the senses of one indi-
vidual ought to participate with the mental concepts abstracted from 
sensible species by another individual. Fifth. it apparentlv asserts that 
these revcaled or manifestcd concepts are the superlative objects of the 
senses. Sixth and last, it proposes that hearing (or more exactlv. audible 
species) should move the eves, rather than speech as originallv stated. 
This last assumption perhaps supposes that the sensus communis has al-
readv coordinated the operation of vision and hearing. 
» M 286-7; cf. SS 205-18. 
'•" LA 2 8 8 ; cf. SS 245-51. 
ui perarnau finds LlulTs argumcnt in this passage unacceptahlc hecause it contradicts 
ordinarV experience ("Lo sise sentj" 77) . 
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Ultimately, however, Llulls argument is incomjilete, because it fails 
to account for the jiower of appetite in animals or of will in humans to 
desire an object and of instinct in animals or cogitation in humans to 
judge that objcct, as usuallv recognized bv the Schoo]men. i r , 1 ) The link 
between motion, desire, and imagination is emphatic in Aristotle's De 
anima and jilays a major role in the affective processes described there . 1 0 0 
The Libre de anima racional briefly notes that affatus stimulates bodily 
delights in the sensitive soul with the imagination. 1" 1 This comment pre-
sumablv refers to the powers of cogitation or fantasizing that the im-
agination includes, but is too short to clarify the exact nature of the 
interaction betwcen those powers. Overall, LIull's arguments regarding 
the interaction between affatus and the extenial or internal senses are 
only comprehensible as a series of comparisons between their respective 
functions: that is, all of his explanations constitute proportional analogies 
between the powers, objects, or media of affatus and those of the other 
senses. This analogy therebv defines a single role for affatus to play in 
both exteroceptive and interoceptive apjnehension. 
The validity of this definition ultimatelv depends upon the same 
Neoplatonic metaphysics of participation through resemblancc that founds 
Llulls entire system.10'- The operation of the senses, imagination, and 
intellect requires likeness in order to ensure thc multiplicatio (in the 
Scholastic sense) of forms or species through the successive stages of 
internal conception or apprehension and external manifestation or re-
ception that affatus includes. Llull defends the model of a sensus agens 
organized by his active and passive correlatives as necessary to ensure 
this participation of intcrnal and external.1',•', This participation implicitlv 
constitutes the "communication" described in virtually all of the passages 
cited already. 1 0 4 An explicit example appears in the explanation of how 
speech is formed (figurata) and informed (specificata) betwecn the internal 
E.g. Aquinas la .78 ,4 and 80 ,2 . 
1"° 3 .10 4331)27-30. On these processes, see Kathy Edcn, Poetic and Legal Fiction rn 
the Aristotelktn Tradition (Princcton: Princcton Univcrsitv Press, 1986) 77. 
1 8 1 2.7.7. (ORL 2 1 : 206) . 
1 M See the excellent succinct explanation of Ruiz Simon, "De la naturalesa com a 
mescla" 81-3 and 90-93. 
l r a See Liber de nossihili et impossibili 3 .2 .5 .6 (ROL 6 : 421-2) . The neccssary bond 
created by the external and internal action of any bcing is indced fundamental to LlulTs 
entire metaphysics; see the excellent discussion by Charles Lohr, "Les fondemcnts de la 
logique nouvelle de Raymond Lulle", Raymond Lulle ct le Paijs d'Oc, Cahiers de Fan-
jeaux 22 (Toulouse: Privat, 1987) 233-48 (csp. 240-7) and Walter W. Artus, "Ramon LIuII, 
the Metaphysician", Antonianum 56 (1981) : 715-49. 
1 , 1 Perarnau notes the importancc accnrded to this relationship, withont attempting to 
explain it ("Lo sisd seny" 54) . 
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mental and extemal verbal manifestation of a concept. Llull avers that 
natural appetite desires the maniiestation made internally in order to be 
able to participate with another animal and to reveal its conception to 
i t . 1 6 G Aristotle suggests that every object of appetite is a real or apparent 
good and Llull describes an equally basic attraction using "elemental ex-
empla"However, he also attributes this innate attraction to the Divine 
Dignities that the speaker, listener, and language all bear. Llull explains 
that words proffered "under the sign" of the Dignities of Bonitas, Magnitu-
do and so forth are necessarily true, while false words necessarily arise 
"outside the sign" of the Dignities; moreover, words receive the Divine 
Dignity of Virtus just as plants or stones do. 1 " 7 This last analogy was a 
commonplace in Scholastic compendia of distinctiones and Llull cites it 
again in his RJietorica nova.UA It extends to language a basis for parti-
cipation, like thc comprehensive elemental composition already described 
for the "line of sensation", and thereby ensures that Hke knows like. 
This communication between external corporeal and internal psychic 
powers allowed LIull to resolve gnoseological problems that vexed his 
Scholastic contemporaries. 1" 9 The acute preoccupation with defining the 
exact connection between sensation and intellection surely contributed to 
Llulls insistence on imagination as an intermediarv stage in his psycho-
logical model. We have already seen how affatus involves some of the 
apprehensive functions conventionally ascribed to imagination. The classi-
fication of speech as a sense allowed him to restore the continuity be-
tween external and internal senses that he lost by distributing them 
The Latin gives "naturalis appetitus desiderat manifestationem faetam interius ut 
eum eo possit participare et ei suam conceptionem valeat propalare" (LA 280) . The Ca-
talan reads "apetit natural dezira la conceptio que es feta dedins per so que ab el pusca 
partissipar e la sua concepti6 manifestar" (SS 19-22). 
De an. 3 .10 433a27. Cf. Liber tamentationis philosophiae 7 (ROL 7: 111-12). 
"T Ars brevis qnae est de inventione iuris 5 .5 (ed. Wohlhaupter 196) . 
Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale MS lat. 6443c , f. 105rb. Cf. e.g. Alan of Lille, Liber 
in distinctionibus dictionum theologicalium, Patrologia Latina 210 (Paris: J.-P. Migne, 1855) 
cols. 685-1012 (at col. 1007, s.v. virtus). 
"* It proves nothing to mention, as Perarnau does ("Lo sise seny" 50-1) , the numerous 
treatises and commentaries de anima written by contemporary Scholastic masters: Llull a!so 
wrote various works on the soul. Comparison of his arguments and theirs does not indicate 
that Lhill ignored the buming questions of his time, but rather that he regarded them 
differcntly: he considered as moral challenges to action questions that the sehoolmen con-
sidered intellectual premises of study. LlmTs arguments certainly dcmonstrate keen con-
cern for the most fundamental issuc of his era, the relationship between corporeal sensa-
tion and intellectual cognition. See the still useful account of Anton Pegis, Saint Thomas 
and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Toronto: Pontifical Instirute of 
Mcdieval Studies, 1934) and the more recent studies cited by Rene Gauthicr, "Le traite 
De anima et de potenciis cius d'un maitre es arts (vers 1225) . Introduction et tevte criti-
que", Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Tlutologiques 6 6 (1982) : 3-55. 
30 M. D. JOIINSTON 
between separate sensitive and iinaginative souls. 1 7" In order to justify 
his classification. Llull strives to show how speech links the sensory and 
intellective functions of the soul, and perfonns both apprehensive and 
expressive operations. But by stressing this cooperation of the internal 
and external or of the corporeal and spiritual, Llull necessarily elides the 
distinction between interoceptive and exteroceptivc faculties or between 
internal and external discourse. 
Nonetheless, Llull deemed that coo£>eration indispcnsable to the moral 
ends that speech should serve. Having examined in detail the physio-
logical and psychological processes of sensation and cognition that affatus 
organizes, we may now turn to considcr how those ends encouraged Llull 
to adapt those processes as he did in his "discovery" that speech functions 
as a sixth sense. 
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